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Key Points
The focus of this paper is on the extremist group Britain First. As such, it 
does not explore online terrorist activity but rather examines how a group 
regarded as extremist is subject to online sanctions. 
The removal of the extremist group Britain First from Facebook in March 
2018 successfully disrupted the group’s online activity, leading them to have 
to start anew on Gab, a different and considerably smaller social media 
platform. The removal also resulted in the group having to seek new online 
followers from a much smaller, less diverse recruitment pool. This paper 
demonstrates the further impact of the group’s platform migration on their 
online strategy – particularly on their choice of images and the engagement 
levels generated through them. The paper puts forward a number of key 
recommendations, most importantly that social-media companies should 
continue to censor and remove hateful content. 
Recommendations 
• Mainstream social media companies should continue to seek to remove 
extremist groups that breach their terms of service.
• The UK and US governments should work towards developing better 
relationships with newer, smaller and fringe platforms in order for 
content to be regulated on these sites.
• Mainstream social media companies should continue and intensify the 
sharing of best practices of the removal and monitoring of extreme 
content, as well as resources, with smaller and newer platforms. 
• Policymakers should strengthen the response to extremist content 
through further collaboration (beyond the major social-media platforms) 
to ensure the consistent removal of content. 
Introduction 
Governments and law enforcement are concerned about the volume and 
spread of internet use in general and social media networks in particular by 
extreme right groups. For example, a 2016 report by the UK Home Affairs 
Select Committee titled Radicalisation: The Counter-Narrative and Identifying 
the Tipping Point, unambiguously stated in relation to extreme right groups’ 
use of social media that ‘[n]etworks like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are 
the vehicle of choice in spreading propaganda and they have become the 
recruiting platforms for terrorism’.1
1. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘Radicalisation:  
The Counter-Narrative and Identifying the Tipping Point’, HC 135, p. 4, 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.
pdf>, accessed 1 July 2019.
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Following US President Donald Trump’s retweeting of posts from Britain First 
in November 2017, UK Prime Minister Theresa May was quick to point out 
that he had been ‘wrong’ to do so2 – highlighting governmental concern 
about the use of social media by extreme right groups. Just over four months 
later, in March 2018, and following the conviction of the leaders of the 
extreme right group Britain First, Paul Golding and Jayda Fransen, on counts 
of hate crime, the group’s Facebook account was removed.3 The removal 
sparked debate about the group’s social media presence. This was not 
surprising, given that it had at the time reached 1.8 million followers and had 
more than 2 million likes, making it the second most-liked Facebook page 
within the politics and society category in the UK, after the royal family.4 
However, experience shows that as soon as something is removed from the 
internet it pops up somewhere else. By May 2018 Britain First had created an 
official page on an emerging and popular social media site that is known for 
low-level censorship: Gab.
This paper examines Britain First’s use of first Facebook and then Gab. 
Specifically, it examines the effect that Facebook’s removal of Britain First’s 
official page had on: the group’s dissemination and influence, in terms of 
numbers of followers, quantity of content posted and engagement level; and 
its visual communication strategy, specifically regarding its choice of images 
and the level of engagement that these generated. 
Background 
Britain First
Britain First was formed in 2011 by Jim Dowson, a former member of the 
British National Party, as a product of the decline of the English Defence 
League.5 Britain First describes itself as a ‘patriotic political party and street 
movement that opposes and fights the many injustices that are routinely 
inflicted on the British people’.6 The group’s leaders state that they are not 
a racist party, claiming that many of their supporters come from ethnic 
minority groups. Yet, they also claim that their goals are to protect British 
and Christian morality, and to preserve the ancestral ethnic and cultural 
2. BBC News, ‘Donald Trump Prepared to Apologise for Britain First Retweets’,  
26 January 2018.
3. Alex Hern and Kevin Rawlinson, ‘Facebook Bans Britain First and its Leaders’, 
The Guardian, 14 March 2018.
4. Patrick Hermansson, ‘Online Hate: The Year In Numbers’, Hope Not Hate, 
undated, <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/research/state-of-hate-2018/
online-radicalisation/online-hate-year-numbers/>, accessed 22 June 2019.
5. Matthew Collins, ‘The Truth About Britain First – The One-Man Band With a 
Knack for Facebook’, The Guardian, 25 February 2015.
6. Britain First’s Mission Statement was available at <https://www.britainfirst.
org/mission-statement>, but has now been removed.
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heritage of the UK while supporting the indigenous British people as the 
demographic majority.7 On their Facebook page (removed on 14 March 
2018), Britain First’s leaders claimed to not be against individual Muslims, 
but specifically against the ideological doctrine and religion of Islam itself.
The leaders of Britain First created Gab profiles around the same time they 
were banned from Twitter in December 2017. However, they did not create 
an official Britain First Gab page (which is the focus of this paper) until May 
2018. Since starting their Gab accounts in December 2017, both leaders have 
managed to attain around 15,000 followers each and at the time of writing 
the official Britain First page has attracted 11,181 followers. 
Gab
Gab was founded in August 2016 and, at the time of writing, is said to 
have 850,000 users.8 Gab’s homepage currently states that it is ‘[a] social 
network that champions free speech, individual liberty and the free flow of 
information online. All are welcome’.9 It is not surprising, therefore, that Gab 
is particularly favoured by public figures associated with the radical right, 
including Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (‘Tommy Robinson’), Milo Yiannopoulos 
and Paul Joseph Watson.10 Gab previously stated that it is anti-censorship, 
declaring previously on its homepage: ‘Censorship and closed systems 
are ultimately about two things: destruction and control … the goal of 
censorship is to silence the storytellers, the truth seekers, the contrarians, 
the artists, those who question the status quo’. It argues that the internet 
belongs to ‘The People’, that Gab is for ‘The People’ and that it is powered 
by ‘The People’.11 As such the use of this platform by Britain First makes for a 
worthwhile comparison to their use of Facebook in terms of content posted 
and level of engagement with the group. 
Social Media Regulatory Landscape 
Although social media platforms are exempt from legal liability for the 
content that their users post on them in Europe by the e-Commerce Directive 
7. Andrew Brindle and Corrie MacMillan, ‘Like & Share if you Agree: A Study of 
Discourses and Cyber Activism of the Far-Right British Nationalist Party Britain First’, 
Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict (Vol. 5, No. 1, 2017), pp. 108–33.
8. Kelly Weill, ‘Gab is in Full Meltdown, and Founder Andrew Torba Blames the 
“Deep State”’, Daily Beast, 30 January 2019.
9. Gab Homepage, ‘Gab’, <https://gab.com/>, accessed 27 June 2019. 
10. Tom Bennett, ‘Gab is the Alt-Right Social Network Racists are Moving to’, Vice, 
5 April 2018.
11. A Torba, ‘Building a People First Community, a Response to Mark Zuckerberg’, 
Medium, 2017, <https://medium.com/@getongab/building-a-people-first-
community-ff97a97f21e9>, accessed July 2018. This article is no longer 
available as Medium has since removed all of Gab’s articles from their site.
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2000/31/EC12 and in the US by Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act,13 they are still expected to take on much of the responsibility for tackling 
the use of their services by both terrorist and extremist groups and individuals. 
In recent years, social media platforms have been under pressure from the 
UK government to do more to remove terrorist and extremist content.14 
The European Commission has repeatedly expressed the responsibility that 
these companies have to remove illegal content and illegal hate speech 
online.15 The direction of regulation recommendations introduced by the 
European Commission over recent years regarding terrorist and extremist 
content has been to encourage platforms to take proactive measures that 
are proportionate to the level of risk, to implement automated detection 
tools, and to remove content within very short time periods of notification 
of the content.16 
Social media platforms address the issue of problematic content and activity 
through the creation and implementation of their own rules or guidelines, 
which their users must follow. Otherwise, the platform can take action 
against those users, groups or content in the form of adding warnings to 
content, removing content and/or banning users. In practice, these rules and 
guidelines differ quite dramatically between platforms, which can result in 
content being removed on one platform but allowed on another. 
12. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, ‘Directive 
2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society 
Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive 
on Electronic Commerce)’, Official Journal of the European Communities  
(L 178/1, 17 July 2000). 
13. ‘Communications Decency Act 1996 (US)’, Section 230. 
14. Rob Merrick, ‘Google and Facebook Among Tech Giants Theresa May Will 
Order to Remove Extremist Content’, The Independent, 19 September 2017; 
Heather Stewart and Jessica Elgot, ‘May Calls on Social Media Giants to do 
More to Tackle Terrorism’, The Guardian, 24 January 2018; Nicholas Mairs, 
‘Theresa May Calls on Social Media Firms to Take Down Christchurch Mosque 
Attack Video’, Politics Home, 15 March 2019.
15. European Commission, ‘The EU Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate 
Speech Online’, undated, <https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-
fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/
countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en>, accessed 22 June 2019; European 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online: 
A Contribution from the European Commission to the Leaders’ Meeting in 
Salzburg on 19–20 September 2018’, COM(2018) 640 final, 12 September 
2018, <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-
640-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>, accessed 22 June 2019.
16. Ibid.
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As far as the two platforms under examination are concerned, Facebook 
has created what it calls ‘Community Standards’ that cover a wide variety 
of issues, ranging from violence/incitement to suicide/self-injury and false 
news. Under ‘Dangerous individuals and organisations’ Facebook states 
that it does not allow organisations or individuals that engage in ‘terrorist 
activity’ or ‘organised hate’, and that any content that expresses support or 
praise for either will result in removal.17 It defines a hate organisation as ‘any 
association of three or more people that is organised under a name, sign or 
symbol and that has an ideology, statements or physical actions that attack 
individuals based on characteristics, including race, religious affiliation, 
nationality, ethnicity, gender, sex, sexual orientation, serious disease or 
disability’.18 In addition to removing Britain First in March 2018, Facebook 
banned several groups and individuals in April 2019 for violating this policy.19 
Gab also has what it has termed ‘Community Guidelines’ and enforces them 
through ‘[r]eminding you to kindly follow our Community Guidelines … 
[and that] in the event that a breach has occurred, beyond a reasonable 
doubt’, illegal content will be removed, and accounts suspended.20 The 
relevant section of Gab’s Community Guidelines for this paper is ‘Threats 
and Terrorism’, which states that: 
Users are prohibited from calling for the acts of violence against others, 
promoting or engaging in self-harm, and/or acts of cruelty, threatening language 
or behaviour that clearly, directly and incontrovertibly infringes on the safety 
of another user or individual(s). We may also report the user(s) to local and/or 
federal law enforcement, as per the advice of our legal counsel. Gab follows the 
U.S. Department of State’s definitions of terrorism and list of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s proscribed list of 
terrorist groups, organizations and/or individuals.21
Methodology
The dataset for the research for this paper comprises 995 images that were 
collected from the official Britain First pages of two social media platforms: 
Facebook (731) and Gab (264) during January to April 2017 and May to 
August 2018, respectively. The dataset includes images that were posted by 
Britain First – rather than any other users or followers – on their own official 
Facebook and Gab pages. 
17. Facebook, ‘Community Standards’, <https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/introduction>, accessed 22 June 2019.
18. Ibid. 
19. Alex Hern, ‘Facebook Bans Far-Right Groups Including BNP, EDL and Britain 
First’, The Guardian, 18 April 2019.
20. Gab, ‘Community Guidelines’, last updated 24 May 2019, <https://gab.com/
about/guidelines>, accessed 22 June 2019.
21. Ibid.
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The scheme for coding the dataset is provided in Appendix 1. It provided 
information regarding the type of images used across platforms and the type 
of engagement that each image type generated (see Results and Discussion); 
as well as the themes represented in the images (see Results and Discussion). 
Results were compared cross-platform, and given their different time spans, 
diachronically, in order to identify any changes to the Britain First’s image 
use strategy in the move from Facebook to Gab. 
Results
Number of Followers, Image Type and User Engagement
At the time of its removal from Facebook, Britain First had achieved a 
following of 1.8 million Facebook users. However, at the time of writing 
(exactly one year since the creation of the official Britain First Gab page), 
the total number of followers on Gab is 11,181. This is an enormous loss of 
followers and reach for the group. 
Table 1 shows the range of image types for Facebook, the total number of 
each image type, the number of comments, reactions and shares per image 
type, and how many times each image type contained text requesting to be 
liked and/or shared. Table 2 shows the equivalent data for Gab.22 
22. Gab (2019) provide the following description of up-voting on their help page 
(which is no longer available): ‘Content on Gab runs on a voting system. Up-
voting content is essentially “liking” it. Down-voting is “disliking” it. Click on 
either the up or down arrows underneath a post to engage with it and “vote” 
for that piece of content. The numbers you see next to the arrows represent 
the total amount of up-/down-votes that post has received’. Reposting is very 
similar to Facebook’s definition of sharing; Gab (2019) states that ‘reposting 
will share the content with your followers so they can see it as well. This 
feature is only available for public accounts’.
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Table 1: Facebook Image Types 
Image Type Total No. of 
Comments
No. of Reactions No. of Shares No. of Asks to 
Like and Share
Photo 574 (74.8%) 104,729 1,076,185 1,486,185 153
Photoshopped 97 (13.3%) 4,940 110,104 98,178 4
Painting 18 (2.5%) 2,392 31,252 495 4
Graphic 35 (4.8%) 2,111 40,135 27,380 3
Text 6 (0.8%) 133 2,341 1,222 0
Drawing 1 (0.1%) 14 158 47 1
Source: Authors’ research. 
Table 2: Gab Image Types 
Image Type Total No. of 
Comments
No. of Up-Votes No. of Reposts No. of Asks to 
Like and Share
Photo 244 (92.4%) 1,339 11,432 4,757 7
Photoshopped 12 (4.5%) 92 858 361 0
Graphic 5 (1.9%) 17 133 67 2
Cartoon 2 (0.8%) 8 112 47 0
Drawing 1 (0.4%) 7 72 26 0
Source: Authors’ research. 
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Two findings stand out from these tables: the first is that Britain First posted 
731 images in total on Facebook over a four-month period, whereas they 
only posted 264 images on Gab over a four-month period. Second, the 
images on Facebook were receiving a much larger number of comments, 
reactions/up-votes and shares/reposts than those posted on Gab. 
Although it is important to note that Britain First was far more established 
on Facebook at the time of data collection than they were on Gab, removal 
from Facebook did create disruption for the group: the number of images 
they were posting decreased and the number of engagements their content 
received decreased during the period of data collection. 
Image Themes
Four image themes were identified: religion; politics; British nationalism; 
and Britain First. Religion refers to any images that included any kind of 
faith-related artefacts or symbols (for example, the Christian cross and the 
Muslim crescent and star). Politics refers to images which had a political focus, 
ranging from political figures to political events and issues. British nationalism 
refers to any image which depicted anything to do with the British nation: 
its people, landscape, culture, traditions (for example, ‘national dishes’) and 
institutions. Britain First refers to any images related to the behaviours and 
membership of the group as well as advertising of the group’s merchandise. 
Within each category, different thematic layers (sub-themes) were identified 
(see Figures 1–18, which illustrate the number of images in each category for 
Facebook and then for Gab).
Figure 1: Facebook Category Total No. of Images
32%
(237)
10%
(73)
33%
(242)
24%
(173)
Religion total
Politics total
British nationalism total
Britain First total
Key:
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Figure 2: Gab Catergory Total No. of Images
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66%
(173)
Religion total
Politics total
British nationalism total
Britain First total
Key:
5% (12)
Figures 1 and 2 show the total number of images in each of the four thematic 
categories across both platforms: religion; politics; British nationalism; and 
Britain First. The category with the highest number of images for Facebook 
is British nationalism (33%), whereas for Gab it is Britain First (66%). This 
suggests a renewed focus on building the group’s identity. Religion is the 
second-largest category for both platforms (Facebook 32%; Gab 21%), 
emphasising its importance to the group.
Figure 3: Facebook: Religion No. of Images
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(198)
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(39)
Islam total
Christianity total
Key:
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Figure 4: Gab: Religion No. of Images
Figure 5: 
100%
(56)
0%
Islam total
Christianity total
Key:
Facebook: Religion No. of Images (Sub-Themes)
Figure 6: 
39%
(93)
44%
(105)
5%
(13) 11%
(26)
Anti-Islam total
Anti-Islamic extremism total
Anti-abortion total
Christianity total
Key:
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Figures 3 and 4 show the number of images for each theme of the religion 
category: Islam and Christianity. Figures 5 and 6 show the sub-themes of 
the religion category. Facebook contained images for both themes, but 
Gab only contained Islam-related images. The Christianity images did not 
receive as many likes, shares and comments on Facebook as many other 
categories and themes, which may explain why Britain First failed to carry 
this theme over to Gab.
Figure 7: Facebook: Politics No. of Images
Figure 8: 
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Figure 9: Facebook: Politics No. of Images (Sub-Themes)
Figure 10: 
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Figures 7 and 8 show the number of images for each theme in the politics 
category. Figures 9 and 10 show the sub-themes in the politics category. 
Facebook contained a variety of political sub-themes, but this was not 
carried over to Gab. This may, similarly to the earlier Christianity theme, be 
the result of the content receiving less engagement than other content. 
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Figure 11: Facebook: British Nationalism No. of Images
Figure 12: 
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Figure 14: Gab: British Nationalism No. of Images (Sub-Themes)
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Figures 11 and 12 show the number of images in the British nationalism 
category. Figures 13 and 14 show the sub-themes within the British 
nationalism category. Facebook had a variety of sub-themes that included 
images related to a variety of institutions, but these were not carried over to 
Gab. Instead the focus on Gab is narrowed down to in- and out-groups and 
saving British culture.
Figure 15: Facebook: Britain First No. of Images
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Figure 16: Gab: Britain First No. of Images
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Figures 15 and 16 show the themes for the Britain First category. 
Figures 17 and 18 show the sub-themes for the Britain First category. 
Once again, Facebook has a wider variety of sub-themes than Gab. On 
Gab there are new themes that were not present on Facebook, such as 
anti-LGBTQ+ images, and images that appeared under further sub-
themes of ‘taking action’, which included threatening to ‘dox’ individuals 
(publish private or identifying information about an individual online 
with malicious intent), and paedophile shaming. Whether or not this is 
simply a new strategy that the group is trying out or a result of being 
on a platform that is less likely to censor, it is important to watch how 
these sub-themes progress and the traction they gain. 
Discussion
Since its removal from Facebook and subsequent migration to Gab, 
Britain First has lost its unprecedentedly large following. Through its 
Facebook page, Britain First was posting images daily and had a large 
number of engagements, as noted over the four-month period of 
research. To date, the group has not managed to carry that following 
or number of engagements over to its new home on Gab. This suggests 
that its ban from Facebook (as well as from Twitter in December 2017) 
has left it without a platform to provide a gateway to a larger pool of 
potential recruits. Its removal from the major social media platforms 
has arguably left it without the ability to signpost users to sites such as 
Gab, which Britain First is still using freely. 
Changes to the themes of the images used by Britain First on both 
Facebook and Gab have been identified. The group’s most common 
image type on Facebook (British nationalism) focused on British people, 
culture and institutions. After moving to Gab, Britain First became the 
most prominent theme, with images focusing on the behaviours and 
members of the group. This suggests a renewed focus on building 
the group’s identity and emphasising the notion of a brotherhood by 
joining the group.
Religion was the second-largest image category for both platforms. 
The group posted pro-Christianity, anti-abortion, anti-Islam and 
anti-Islamist extremism images on Facebook, but appeared to drop 
considerably its use of pro-Christianity and anti-abortion images on 
Gab. This may be due to these images receiving less engagement than 
the anti-Islam and anti-Islamist extremism images. It is likely that the 
group would have decided to continue posting images based only on 
the themes that were known to receive more traction. 
A change was also noted in the politics image theme. On Facebook 
this theme had many sub-themes, while on Gab it only had an 
anti-government sub-theme, which could indicate a move away from 
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the group’s push to gain political legitimacy since the migration to Gab 
(although this is not necessarily directly evident from the data).
The final notable change is in the Britain First theme. New sub-themes have 
appeared on Gab, including threatening to ‘dox’ individuals, paedophile 
shaming and anti-LGBTQ+ images. This could be part of a new strategy of 
identity polarisation, whereby certain individuals or groups (the out-groups) 
are vilified and Britain First (the in-group) is exalted. For example, the 
posting of paedophile-shaming images – an image of a person who the group 
claims has been identified as a paedophile – portray Britain First as ‘heroes’ 
defending society from arguably the worst deviants known. 
Finally, the anti-LGBTQ+ images may have been something Britain First 
always wanted to post but were unable to on Facebook due to its stricter 
policies. Alternatively, the appearance of all three of these themes may just 
be a result of Britain First taking advantage of Gab being less likely to censor 
content online. 
Conclusions 
Britain First’s removal from Facebook has disrupted the group’s online 
strategy, which has had to migrate to a new platform – Gab. This has meant 
it has had to re-establish an online following on a smaller platform, resulting 
in a much smaller recruitment pool in terms of users. Further, removal from 
Facebook has brought about changes in the types of images Britain First 
posts online. Despite the decrease in followers on Gab, the themes found in 
Britain First’s imagery demonstrate a move towards more extreme content 
in the course of their migration to Gab, likely due to the platform being less 
likely to censor content. It is therefore recommended that future research 
investigates how this social media strategy progresses. 
Policy Recommendations
In light of the above, the following steps are recommended: 
• Removal is clearly effective, even if it is not risk-free. Despite the risk of 
groups migrating to more permissive spaces, mainstream social media 
companies should continue to seek to remove extremist groups that 
breach their terms of service. This research for this paper shows that in 
doing so the possibility for groups to use these platforms as gateways 
to signpost followers to more extreme content on less stringent sites is 
removed, and that the pool of potential recruits is reduced.
• The UK and US governments should work towards developing better 
relationships with newer, smaller and fringe platforms in order for 
content to be regulated on these sites. Otherwise, content removal 
from mainstream sites could just worsen the content posted on other 
platforms that are seen to be more lenient.
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• Mainstream social media companies should continue and intensify the 
sharing of best practices of the removal and monitoring of extreme 
content, as well as resources, with smaller and newer platforms. 
• As a complement to regulation, policymakers should strengthen 
the response to extremist content through further collaboration 
(beyond the major social media platforms) to ensure the consistent 
removal of content. 
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Appendix 1 
Coding Scheme for Dataset
Date Posted
User engagement Facebook: sum total of reactions to the image, total number of comments on the image
Gab: total number of up-votes, comments, and re-posts
Image type Photograph, drawing, painting, etc.
Accompanying text In-image text; caption
Image content Description of elements (social actors, objects, etc.) in focus/out of focus
Image technical properties Focal angle, focal length, blurring, etc.
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